We study bilateral cross-licensing agreements among N (> 2) competing …rms. We …nd that the fully cooperative royalty, i.e., the one that allows them to achieve the monopoly pro…t, can be sustained as the outcome of bilaterally e¢ cient agreements, regardless of whether the agreements are public or private and whether …rms compete in quantities or prices. We extend this monopolization result to a general class of two-stage games in which …rms bilaterally agree in the …rst stage to make each other payments that depend on their second-stage non-cooperative actions. Policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross-licensing agreements are derived.
Introduction
A cross-license is an agreement between two …rms that allows each to practice the other's patents (Shapiro, 2001, and Régibeau and Rockett, 2011) . Cross-licensing has been a widespread practice for a long time. For instance, Taylor and Silberston (1973) report that, in many industries, cross-licensing accounts for a signi…cant share of all licensing arrangements: 50% in the telecommunications and broadcasting industry, 25% in the electronic components sector, 23% in the pharmaceutical industry, etc. 1 Cross-licensing is therefore likely to have an impact on competition in a large number of sectors.
Cross-licensing agreements involve both technological and monetary transfers. Technological transfers are generally perceived as pro-competitive: they can result in goods being produced at lower costs by potentially more …rms. These transfers are particularly useful in Information Technology (IT) industries, such as the semiconductor and mobile phone industries, where the intellectual property rights necessary to market a product are typically held by a large number of parties, a situation known as a patent thicket (Shapiro, 2001; U.S. DoJ and FTC, 2007; Galasso and Schankerman, 2010) . 2 Monetary transfers, however, can be anticompetitive. More speci…cally, high per-unit royalties can allow …rms to sustain high prices.
A natural question that arises is the following: do cross-licensing partners have incentives to agree on high royalties? The existing literature (discussed below) provides an answer to this question in a duopoly setting: in such environment, …rms sign a cross-licensing agreement with royalties high enough to replicate the monopoly pro…t (see e.g., Fershtman and Kamien, 1992) .
This monopolization result can be generalized in a straightforward way to a setting with more than two …rms signing a multilateral agreement involving all of them (see Section 2.2).
However, in the typical scenario observed in practice, i.e., bilateral cross-licensing in industries comprised of more than two …rms, it is unclear whether two given …rms would agree on high royalties. First, this might weaken their competitive positions with respect to their rivals. Second, if the terms of the cross-licenses are publicly observable and …rms compete in quantities, they have incentives to agree on low royalties to be perceived as e¢ cient and, therefore, aggressive by their competitors. We build a model to investigate whether bilateral cross-licensing agreements can still allow …rms to sustain the monopoly outcome in the presence of these countervailing e¤ects.
We consider N (> 2) competing …rms owning one patent each. Firms can get access to the technologies covered by their rivals'patents through cross-licensing agreements, before compet-1 In particular, cross-licensing in the semiconductor industry has received much attention in the literature (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Galasso, 2012) . 2 According to FTC (2011, pp.55-56) , "The IT patent landscape involves products containing a multitude of components, each covered by numerous patents. ... This contrasts with the relationship between products and patents in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries where innovation is generally directed at producing a discrete product covered by a small number of patents." Patent thickets raise many concerns and are considered as one of the most crucial intellectual property issues of the day (Shapiro, 2007; Régibeau and Rockett, 2011). ing in the product market. We suppose that the larger the set of patents to which a …rm has access, the lower its marginal cost. 3 In the baseline model, we assume that …rms are symmetric and engage in Cournot competition and focus on symmetric equilibria where all cross-licensing agreements specify the same royalty. We show the robustness of our main results by considering a number of extensions of our basic setup.
We focus on bilaterally e¢ cient agreements. A set of cross-licensing agreements is said to be bilaterally e¢ cient if each agreement maximizes the joint pro…t of the pair of …rms who signed it, given all other agreements. Note that a …rm's overall pro…t is comprised of its downstream pro…t, i.e., the pro…t it makes from selling its product, and the upstream pro…t generated by patent licensing. We distinguish between public and private cross-licensing agreements: the terms of a private agreement are observable only to the parties who sign the agreement while in the case of a public agreement, the terms are observable to all the …rms in the industry.
Consider …rst the case of public cross-licensing agreements. We show that the royalties that two …rms in a coalition charge each other have two opposite e¤ects on their joint downstream pro…t: the Stackelberg e¤ ect, which captures the fact that the …rms can in ‡uence their rivals' outputs through their choice of royalties, and the coordination e¤ ect, which refers to the idea that two …rms can restrict their joint output by increasing the royalties they charge each other.
We also show that the royalties have two opposite e¤ects on the …rms' joint upstream pro…t:
the royalty-saving e¤ ect and the licensing revenue e¤ ect. The former refers to the fact that the royalties paid to each other are transfers within the coalition and hence do not count as a cost in the joint pro…t, while the latter captures the idea that these royalties in ‡uence the licensing revenues collected from the rivals by a¤ecting their output choices.
We show that a two-…rm coalition's deviation in the (public) cross-licensing stage always has opposite e¤ects on its downstream and upstream pro…ts. It turns out that these two e¤ects cancel out when the (symmetric) per-unit royalty charged by …rms is the one that maximizes the industry pro…t. This implies that the monopoly outcome can always be sustained through bilaterally e¢ cient agreements. Moreover, we establish that, when the Stackelberg e¤ect dominates the coordination e¤ect, the situation in which all …rms charge each other zero per-unit royalty (i.e. the most competitive outcome) is also sustainable as a bilaterally e¢ cient outcome.
Consider now the case of private cross-licensing agreements. The only di¤erence with the scenario of public cross-licensing is that the Stackelberg e¤ect and the licensing revenue e¤ect are now absent. Using this, we show that the royalty allowing to achieve the monopoly outcome is the unique bilaterally e¢ cient royalty under private cross-licensing.
Thus, the monopoly outcome can be sustained when cross-licensing agreements are decided bilaterally, independent of whether the agreements are public or private. We show that this monopolization result extends to i/ a setting in which the terms of the cross-licensing agreements are agreed upon by coalitions of any size and ii/ an environment in which …rms compete in prices rather than quantities. We also establish that this …nding holds in a general two-stage model that allows for all kinds of asymmetries and applies to any situation in which …rms that have downstream interactions sell inputs to each other through bilateral agreements. Examples include cross-licensing of patents, two-way access pricing in telecommunications (Armstrong, 1998; La¤ont, Rey, Tirole, 1998a,b) , interconnection among Internet backbone companies (Crémer, Rey and Tirole, 2000) and interbank payments for the use of ATMs (Donze and Dubec, 2006) .
Finally, our analysis generates policy implications for the antitrust treatment of crosslicensing. Both American and European competition authorities grant antitrust safety zone to (cross-) licensing agreements signed by …rms whose combined market share is below a certain threshold. For instance, Article 3 of the EC Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation provides antitrust exemption to bilateral licensing agreements between competitors if their combined market share does not exceed 20%. 4 These policies are implicitly based on the presumption that market forces can discipline cross-licensing partners regarding the level of royalties they agree on: …rms with relatively low market power are expected to …nd it unprofitable to charge each other high per-unit royalties. However, the existing theoretical literature on cross-licensing does not allow to analyze the relevance of such exemptions since it studies bilateral cross-licensing only in a duopoly setting. Our …ndings question those exemptions since they show that cross-licensing can actually allow …rms in a given industry to implement the monopoly outcome regardless of their number and their market shares.
Related literature
Our paper contributes to the literature on the competitive e¤ects of cross-licensing agreements and patent pools. In a pioneering paper, Priest (1977) shows how these practices can be used as a disguise for cartel arrangements. Fershtman and Kamien (1992) develop a model in which two …rms engage in a patent race for two complementary patents and use it to shed light on the social trade-o¤ underlying cross-licensing agreements. On the one hand, cross-licensing improves the e¢ ciency of the R&D investments by eliminating the duplication of e¤orts. On the other hand, it favors price collusion between …rms. Eswaran (1994) shows that cross-licensing can enhance the degree of collusion achieved in a repeated game by credibly introducing the threat of increased rivalry in the market for each …rm's product. 5 Shapiro (2001) shows that patent pools tend to raise (lower) welfare when patents are perfect complements (substitutes), an idea which is generalized to intermediate levels of substitutability/complementarity by Lerner and Tirole (2004) , and further explored in the case of uncertain patents by Choi (2010) and Choi and Gerlach (2014) . 6 To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the …rst formalized study of the competitive e¤ects of bilateral cross-licensing agreements in an industry comprised of more than two …rms. 7
Our paper is closely related to the literature on opportunism in a multilateral vertical contracting environment (Hart and Tirole, 1990; O'Brien and Sha¤er, 1992; McAfee and Schwartz, 1994; Rey and Vergé, 2004) . This literature mostly focuses on the situation in which an upstream monopolist signs bilateral contracts with competing downstream …rms 8 and distinguishes between public and private contracting depending on whether the terms of a given bilateral contract are observed by the rival downstream …rms. An important insight of the existing papers is that the upstream monopolist achieves the monopoly outcome when contracts are public but fails to do so when contracts are private. Our paper is similar to this literature in three respects.
First, we also consider a two-stage game in which simultaneous bilateral agreements are followed by downstream competition. Second, our equilibrium concept of bilateral e¢ ciency is similar to the concepts of market-by-market bargaining (Hart and Tirole, 1990) , contract equilibrium (O'Brien and Sha¤er, 1992) and pairwise-proof contracts (McAfee and Schwartz, 1994) . Third, we also distinguish between public and private contracting. Despite these similarities, our results are very di¤erent from those of this literature. We …nd that the monopoly outcome is the unique equilibrium outcome under private contracting whereas in the case of public contracting, in addition to the monopoly outcome, the most competitive outcome can be an equilibrium outcome. In contrast, McAfee and Schwartz (1994) show that the upstream monopolist fails to achieve the monopoly outcome under private contracting for both passive and wary beliefs.
Our paper is also related to the literature on strategic formation of networks surveyed in Goyal (2007) and Jackson (2008) . In particular, the concept of bilateral e¢ ciency we use is similar to the widespread re…nement concept of pairwise stability (e.g., Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) . Goyal and Moraga-Gonzales (2001) and Goyal, Moraga-Gonzales and Konovalov (2008) also study two-stage games where a network formation stage is followed by a competition stage.
However, they examine ex ante R&D cooperation, while we study ex post licensing agreements.
In addition, they do not allow for transfers among …rms while we allow for …xed fees and royalties.
Our paper is also related to Bloch and Jackson (2007) who develop a general framework to examine the issue of network formation with transfers among players. A crucial di¤erence however between their framework and our setting is that we allow the agreements among …rms 6 Choi and Gerlach (2014) show that in the case of uncertain patents, pooling complementary patents can decrease welfare by shielding them from potential litigation. 7 In our companion paper (Jeon and Lefouili, 2014), we study bilateral licensing agreements in an industry with more than two competitors. However, in that paper, licensing contracts are assumed to involve …xed fees only and we focus on how equilibrium networks of bilateral licensing contracts a¤ect market structure. That paper is complementary to the current paper as it shows that even when royalties cannot be used to raise prices, bilateral licensing agreements can reduce welfare by inducing exclusion of some …rms.
8 Rey and Vergé (2010) and Nocke and Rey (2014) extend the basic setting in Hart and Tirole (1990) by considering an environment in which upstream …rms have interlocking relationships with downstream …rms.
to involve the payment of per-unit royalties in addition to …xed fees while they only consider lump-sum transfers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the baseline model with Cournot competition. Section 3 (Section 4) characterizes bilaterally e¢ cient public (private) cross-licensing agreements. Section 5 discusses two extensions of the basic setup. Section 6 introduces a general model and shows that our monopolization result holds in a wide range of circumstances. Section 7 derives policy implications regarding the current antitrust treatment of cross-licensing agreements in the U.S. and E.U. Section 8 gathers concluding remarks. All the proofs are relegated to the Appendix. A number of extensions are provided in the supplementary material.
The Model

Setting
Consider an industry consisting of N 3 symmetric …rms producing a homogeneous good.
Each …rm owns one patent 9 covering a cost-reducing technology and can get access to its rivals' patents through cross-licensing agreements. We assume that the patents are symmetric in the sense that the marginal cost of a …rm only depends on the number of patents it has access to.
Let c(n) be a …rm's marginal cost when it has access to a number n 2 f1; :::; N g of patents with c(N )( c) c(N 1) ::: c(1)( c). Let c c c.
We consider a two-stage game in which, prior to engaging in Cournot competition, each pair of …rms can sign a cross-licensing agreement whereby each party gets access to the patented technology of the other one. More precisely, the two-stage game is described as follows:
Stage 1: Cross-licensing Each pair of …rms (i; j) 2 f1; :::; N g 2 with i 6 = j decide whether to sign a cross-licensing agreement and determine the terms of the agreement if any. We assume that a bilateral crosslicensing agreement between …rm i and …rm j speci…es a pair of royalties (r i!j ; r j!i ) 2 [0; +1) 2 and a lump-sum transfer F i!j 2 ( 1; +1) ; where r i!j (resp. r j!i ) is the per-unit royalty paid by …rm i (resp. …rm j) to …rm j (resp. …rm i) and F i!j is a transfer made by …rm i to …rm j (which is negative if …rm i receives a transfer from …rm j). 10 All bilateral negotiations occur simultaneously.
Stage 2: Cournot competition 9 Given that we consider that …rms have symmetric patent portfolios, we can assume, without loss of generality, that each …rm has one patent.
1 0 We restrict attention to non-negative royalties for two reasons. First, negative royalties are rarely observed (Liao and Sen, 2005, p. 291) . Second, in the presence of monitoring costs, at least small negative royalties are dominated by zero royalty since zero royalty does not require any monitoring of rivals' output to enforce the licensing contract (Katz and Shapiro, 1985, p. 508 ).
Firms compete à la Cournot with the cost structure inherited from Stage 1.
Depending on the observability of the terms of the agreement between two …rms to their rivals, we distinguish between public cross-licensing and private cross-licensing. In the case of public cross-licensing, all …rms observe the terms of all the cross-licensing agreements signed at stage 1 before they engage in Cournot competition. In contrast, in the case of private crosslicensing, the terms of the cross-licensing agreement between …rms i and j are known only to these two …rms and, therefore, each …rm k 6 = i; j should form a conjecture about those terms.
We assume that the …rms face an inverse demand function P ( ) satisfying the following standard conditions (Novshek, 1985) :
A1 P ( ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable and P 0 ( ) < 0 whenever P ( ) > 0:
A2 P (0) > c > c > P (Q) for Q su¢ ciently high.
These mild assumptions ensure the existence and uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium (q i ) i=1;:::;n satisfying the following (intuitive) comparative statics properties, where c i denote …rm i's marginal cost (see e.g., Amir, Encaoua and Lefouili, 2014): i/ @q i @c i < 0 and @q i @c j > 0 for any j 6 = i; @Q @c i < 0 for any i, where Q = X i q i is the total equilibrium output;
ii/ @ i @c i < 0 and @ i @c j > 0 for any j 6 = i, where i is …rm i's equilibrium pro…t.
Benchmark: multilateral licensing agreement
We consider here as a benchmark the case of a multilateral licensing agreement among all N …rms. This corresponds to a closed patent pool (Lerner and Tirole, 2004), i.e., a patent pool whose only customers are its contributors. We focus on a symmetric outcome where all …rms pay the same royalty r to each other.
Let P m (c) be the monopoly price when each …rm's marginal cost is c. It is characterized by
where "(:) is the elasticity of demand.
Given a symmetric royalty r, each …rm's marginal cost is c + (N 1)r. The …rms will agree on a royalty to achieve the monopoly price. Given a symmetric royalty r, …rm i chooses its output q i in the second stage to maximize [P (Q i + q i ) c (N 1)r] q i + rQ i where Q i Q q i is the quantity chosen by all other …rms. Let r m be the royalty that allows to achieve the monopoly price P m (c). Then, from the …rst-order condition associated with …rm i's maximization program, we have
From (1) and (2), r m is determined by
Proposition 1 (Multilateral licensing). Suppose that all …rms in the industry jointly agree on a symmetric royalty. Then they agree on r m = (P m (c) c) =N , which allows them to achieve the monopoly price P m (c) as an equilibrium price.
Let us now examine under which condition the multilateral licensing agreement will lead to a higher downstream price compared to the situation before cross-licensing. Let Q (N; c)
represent the industry output when N …rms with the marginal cost c compete in quantity.
Therefore, the equilibrium price prior to licensing is P (Q (N; c)). At P (Q (N; c)) we have
From (1) and (4) 
Note that the right hand side of (5) does not depend on c. As the cost reduction from licensing increases, c is smaller and the monopoly price is smaller. Therefore, we must have 3 Characterization of the bilaterally e¢ cient public agreements
In this section, we consider public bilateral cross-licensing agreements.
Preliminaries
We …rst de…ne our solution concept.
De…nition 1 A set of public cross-licensing agreements is bilaterally e¢ cient if, for any pair of …rms (i; j), the bilateral agreement between i and j maximizes their joint pro…t, given all other bilateral agreements and the (anticipated) equilibrium outcome of the competition stage.
Since any bilateral agreement can specify a …xed fee, we argue that it is reasonable to assume that any bilateral agreement signed between a pair of …rms maximizes their joint pro…t. Our solution concept is similar to the concept of contract equilibrium (Crémer and Riordan, 1987; O'Brien and Sha¤er, 1992) and pairwise-proof contracts (McAfee and Schwartz, 1994) . It is also closely related to the concept of Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains used in the bilateral monopoly/oligopoly literature (Horn and Wolinsky, 1988 ; Collard-Wexler, Gowrisankaran and Lee, 2014) 11 .
Notice …rst that any given pair of …rms …nd it (jointly) optimal to sell a license to each other. To see why, assume that …rm i does not license its patent to …rm j. These two …rms can (weakly) increase their joint pro…t if i licenses its patent to j by specifying the payment of a per-unit royalty r j!i equal to the reduction in marginal cost allowed by j's use of the technology covered by i's patent. Such licensing agreement would not a¤ect the level of joint output but will (weakly) decrease the cost of …rm j. It will therefore (weakly) increase their joint pro…t.
In what follows, we consider a symmetric situation where all …rms sign bilateral crosslicensing agreements. Let r denote the (common) per-unit royalty paid by any …rm i to have access to the patent of any …rm j 6 = i with i; j = 1; :::; N , and S(r; N ) denote the corresponding set of cross-licensing agreements. We below study the joint incentives of a coalition of two …rms to deviate from the symmetric royalty r under the assumption that all …rms are active (i.e., produce a positive output) no matter what the royalties the deviating coalition chooses. 12
The next lemma shows that it is su¢ cient to focus on deviations such that …rms in the deviating coalition pay the same royalty to each other. Indeed, the joint payo¤ from any asymmetric deviation can be replicated by a symmetric one because the joint payo¤ depends on the royalties paid by each …rm to the other only through their sum.
Lemma 1 Consider a symmetric set of cross-licensing agreements S(r; N ). The joint payo¤ a coalition fi; jg gets from a deviation to a cross-licensing agreement in which …rm i (resp. …rm j) pays a royalty r i!j (resp. r j!i ) to …rm j (resp. …rm i) depends on (r i!j ; r j!i ) only through the sum r i!j + r j!i .
Proof. See Appendix. Consider a deviation by the coalition formed by …rms 1 and 2, which we denote by {1,2}.
Letr be the royalty that these …rms charge to each other. For given (r;r), let Q (r;r) denote the total industry output and Q 12 (r;r) denote the sum of the outputs of …rms 1 and 2 in the (second-stage) Cournot equilibrium. Let Q 12 (r;r) Q (r;r) Q 12 (r;r). Then, the considered set of symmetric agreements is bilaterally e¢ cient if and only if:
where 12 (r;r) = [P (Q 12 (r;r) + BR 12 (Q 12 (r;r))) (c + (N 2) r)] Q 12 (r;r) + 2rBR 12 (Q 12 (r;r))
is the joint pro…t of the coalition and BR 12 (:) is de…ned as follows. If N = 3; then BR 12 (:)
is the best-response function of …rm 3. If N 4, then BR 12 (:) is the aggregate response of the coalition's rivals: for any joint output Q 12 = q 1 + q 2 of …rms 1 and 2, BR 12 (Q 12 ) is the (unique) real number such that BR 12 (Q 12 ) N 2 is the best-response of any …rm i 2 f3; :::; N g to each …rm k 2 f1; 2g producing q k and each …rm j 2 f3; :::; N g n fig producing BR 12 (Q 12 ) N 2
:
After observing the coalition's deviation tor 6 = r, its rivals expect it to produce Q 12 (r;r) and will best respond to this quantity by producing BR 12 (Q 12 (r;r)) in aggregate. In other words, from a strategic point of view, the coalition's deviation tor 6 = r is equivalent to its commitment to produce Q 12 (r;r) as a Stackelberg leader. For this reason, we below de…ne the following two-stage Stackelberg game.
De…nition 2 For any r 0 and N 3, the Stackelberg game G(r; N ) is de…ned by the following elements:
Players The following lemma provides an equivalence result that is useful for the subsequent analysis.
Lemma 2 A symmetric set of cross-licensing agreements S(r; N ) is bilaterally e¢ cient if and only if choosing Q 12 (r; r) is optimal for the coalition in the Stackelberg game G(r; N ):
Proof. See Appendix.
Incentives to deviate: downstream and upstream pro…ts
We now study the incentives of coalition f1; 2g to marginally expand or contract its output with respect to Q 12 (r; r) in the game G(r; N ). Note that the coalition's marginal cost in that game is c + (N 2) r whereas each of its member's marginal cost at the Cournot stage of the original game presented in Section 2 is c + (N 1) r. The di¤erence between the two has to do with the royalty payment between …rms 1 and 2. In what follows, we call rQ 12 the royalty saving of the coalition (as compared to a single …rm producing the same quantity Q 12 ).
The coalition's pro…t can be rewritten as
The term D 12 (Q 12 ; r) represents the coalition's pro…t in the downstream product market. 13 The term U 12 (Q 12 ; r) represents the coalition's pro…t in the upstream market of patent licensing. This pro…t is composed of the royalty saving and the licensing revenues received from all …rms outside the coalition. We below study the e¤ect of a (local) variation of Q 12 on each of the two sources of pro…t.
E¤ect on the downstream pro…t
The partial derivative of D 12 (Q 12 ; r) with respect to Q 12 , when evaluated at Q 12 (r; r), is given by
The term P 0 (Q (r; r)) Q 12 (r; r)BR 0 12 (Q 12 (r; r)) > 0 in (7) captures the (usual) Stackelberg e¤ ect: the leader has an incentive to increase its output Q 12 above the Cournot level Q 12 (r; r) because such an increase will be met with a decrease in the aggregate output of the followers (one can easily check that BR 0 12 (Q 12 (r; r)) < 0). It is very useful to rewrite this term as 2 [P (Q (r; r)) (c + (N 1) r)] BR 0 12 (Q 12 ), which is obtained from the F.O.C. of …rm i (with i = 1; 2) in the Cournot game: P 0 (Q (r; r)) Q 12 (r; r) 2 + P (Q (r; r)) (c + (N 1) r) = 0:
The term P 0 (Q (r; r)) Q 12 (r; r) + [P (Q (r; r)) (c + (N 1) r)] in (7) represents the marginal downstream pro…t of the coalition in a setting where it would play a simultaneous quantitysetting game with its rivals. This term captures a coordination e¤ ect: the coalition has an incentive to reduce output below the Cournot level Q 12 (r; r) since the joint output of the coalition when each member chooses its quantity in a non-cooperative way is too high with respect to what maximizes its joint downstream pro…t (in a simultaneous quantity-setting game). Indeed, using (8), we have:
P 0 (Q (r; r)) Q 12 (r; r) + [P (Q (r; r)) (c + (N 1) r)] = [P (Q (r; r)) (c + (N 1) r)] < 0:
Therefore, the overall marginal e¤ect of a local increase of Q 12 (above the Cournot level Q 12 (r; r)) on the coalition's downstream pro…t is given by:
The …rst term between brackets in (9) is positive while the sign of the second term between brackets in (9) can be either positive or negative.
E¤ect on the upstream pro…t
Let us now turn to the e¤ect of a local variation in Q 12 on the coalition's upstream pro…t U 12 (Q 12 ): We have:
We identify two opposite e¤ects on the upstream pro…t. On the one hand, a marginal increase in Q 12 results in a larger royalty saving. We call this the royalty-saving e¤ ect. On the other hand, a marginal increase in Q 12 induces the rivals of the coalition to reduce their output by BR 0 12 (Q 12 ) and hence results in a reduction of 2r BR 0 12 (Q 12 ) in the licensing revenues that the coalition gets from its rivals. We call this the licensing revenue e¤ ect.
Even if the e¤ect of an increase in Q 12 (above the Cournot level Q 12 (r; r)) on each of the coalition's two sources of pro…ts is ambiguous, it follows from (9) and (10) that the sign of the e¤ ect on the downstream pro…t is always opposite to the sign of the e¤ ect on the upstream pro…t.
Incentives to deviate: four cases
By summing up (9) and (10), the total e¤ect of a marginal increase in Q 12 on the coalition's pro…t can be described in a simple way as:
We can distinguish four cases depending on whether the Stackelberg e¤ect is stronger or weaker than the coordination e¤ect 14 and whether the e¤ect of a local deviation on the downstream pro…t dominates or is dominated by its e¤ect on the upstream pro…t.
Stackelberg e¤ect vs. coordination e¤ect
Let us …rst examine the term 1 + 2BR 0 12 (Q 12 (r; r)) in (11) which determines whether the Stackelberg e¤ect is stronger or weaker than the coordination e¤ect. The F.O.C. for the maxi-mization program of any …rm i (i = 3; :::; N ), when the coalition produces a given quantity Q 12 , can be written as:
Di¤erentiating the latter with respect to Q 12 (and dropping the argument (r; r))) yields
This, combined with P 0 (Q) < 0, proves that 1 < BR 0 12 (Q 12 ) < 0 (a result that will be useful later), and, when evaluated at Q 12 = Q 12 , yields
because the equality BR 12 (Q 12 ) = N 2 N Q holds as the corresponding equilibrium is symmetric. Distinguishing between the two scenarios P 00 (Q ) 0 and P 00 (Q ) > 0 and using the fact that BR 12 (Q 12 ) Q , one can easily show that A3 implies that the denominator is always negative. Therefore, from P 0 (Q ) < 0, it follows that
This shows that the coordination e¤ect dominates the Stackelberg e¤ect (1 + 2BR 0 12 (Q 12 ) > 0) if and only if the slope of the inverse demand is su¢ ciently elastic ( Q P 00 (Q ) P 0 (Q ) > N (N 3) N 2 ). In particular, for N 4, under A3, the Stackelberg e¤ect always dominates the coordination e¤ect.
Downstream pro…t vs. upstream pro…t
Let us now examine the term c+N r P (Q (r; r)) f (r; N ) in (11). The e¤ect of an increase in Q 12 on the downstream pro…t (strictly) dominates the e¤ect on the upstream pro…t if and only if f (r; N ) < 0. For instance, when r = 0, there is no upstream pro…t and we have f (0; N ) = c P (Q (0; 0)) < 0. Intuitively, we expect that the upstream pro…t becomes more important as r increases, which turns out to be true as we below show that @f @r (r; N ) = N dQ dr P 0 (Q ) > 0: Adding the F.O.Cs for each …rm i's maximization program from i = 1 to i = N yields P 0 (Q ) Q + N P (Q ) N (c + (N 1)r) = 0:
Di¤erentiating the latter with respect to r leads to dQ dr P 0 (Q ) + P 00 (Q ) Q + N P 0 (Q ) dQ dr (N 1) = 0:
From P 0 (Q ) + P 00 (Q ) Q < 0 (by A3) and dQ dr < 0, it follows that P 0 (Q ) dQ dr (N 1) < 0, which implies that @f @r (r; N ) > 0 for any N 3. Since f (r; N ) strictly increases with r, the solution in r to f (r; N ) = 0 is unique whenever it exists.
Surprisingly, it turns out that the unique royalty r for which f (r; N ) = 0 is the fully cooperative royalty r m , as de…ned in (3). At r = r m , we have that P (Q (r m ; r m )) = P m (c) and, therefore, c + N r m P (Q (r m ; r m )) = 0 (from Proposition 1). Thus, for r < r m , the e¤ect on the downstream pro…t dominates the e¤ect on the upstream pro…t and the reverse holds for r > r m .
Bilaterally e¢ cient royalties
From the previous analysis of local deviations, we know that there are four possible cases depending on which of the Stackelberg e¤ect and the coordination e¤ect is stronger and which of the downstream pro…t e¤ect and the upstream pro…t e¤ect dominates.
Consider …rst the case in which the Stackelberg e¤ect is stronger than the coordination e¤ect. Then, if the downstream pro…t e¤ect dominates the upstream pro…t e¤ect (i.e., r belongs to [0; r m )), the coalition has an incentive to decrease its royalty 15 in order to induce the rivals to reduce their outputs, which generates r = 0 as the unique potential bilateral e¢ cient royalty among royalties r in [0; r m ). If the upstream pro…t e¤ect dominates the downstream pro…t e¤ect (i.e., r > r m ), the coalition has an incentive to increase its royalty to boost the rivals' production and thereby the licensing revenues it receives from them. At r = r m , the downstream pro…t e¤ect is equal to the upstream pro…t e¤ect and the coalition has no incentive to deviate locally. In summary, when the Stackelberg e¤ect dominates the coordination e¤ect, there are two potential bilaterally e¢ cient royalties: r = 0 and r = r m . Now let us consider the case in which the coordination e¤ect is stronger than the Stackelberg e¤ect. Then, if the downstream pro…t e¤ect dominates the upstream pro…t e¤ect (i.e., r belongs to [0; r m )), the coalition has an incentive to increase its royalty in order to boost its downstream prices. In a symmetric way, if the upstream pro…t e¤ect dominates the downstream pro…t e¤ect (i.e., r > r m ), the coalition has an incentive to decrease its royalty. In summary, when the coordination e¤ect is stronger than the Stackelberg e¤ect, we have a unique potential bilaterally e¢ cient royalty: r = r m .
The local analysis above allowed us to identify candidates for bilaterally e¢ cient royalties.
It remains to perform a global analysis (i.e., to examine global and not only local deviations) in order to con…rm that the candidates are indeed bilaterally e¢ cient. The following proposition follows from our global analysis:
Proposition 2 (public bilateral cross-licensing) Consider the two-stage game of public crosslicensing followed by Cournot competition. Proof. See Appendix. This proposition shows that the monopoly outcome is always sustainable through bilaterally e¢ cient public agreements. Moreover, if the Stackelberg e¤ect is stronger than the coordination e¤ect then the most competitive outcome (i.e., the one corresponding to r = 0) is also sustainable through bilaterally e¢ cient public agreements.
Private cross-licensing
In this section, we consider private cross-licensing: each bilateral cross-licensing agreement is only observable to the two …rms involved in it. Hence, at the beginning of the competition stage, each …rm is only aware of the terms of the contracts it signed itself and should form expectations regarding the terms agreed on by its competitors. As in the public cross-licensing case, we de…ne a bilaterally e¢ cient set of agreements as one such that the agreement between any pair of …rms maximizes their joint pro…ts given all other agreements. However, in contrast to the public crosslicensing case, a deviation by a two-…rm coalition in the cross-licensing stage is not observed by its rivals who keep the same beliefs about the agreements made by their competitors. Moreover, when a coalition of two …rms deviates by changing the terms of the agreement between them, each of these two …rms maintains the same beliefs about the agreements signed by its rivals. This assumption is in a sense the counterpart in our setting of the usual passive-belief assumption in the literature on vertical contracting (Hart and Tirole, 1990; McAfee and Schwartz, 1994) .
We can show that Lemma 1 continues to hold in the case of private cross-licensing and, therefore, restrict attention to deviations involving a symmetric royalty (within the deviating coalition). Moreover, a result similar to Lemma 2 holds: the symmetric set of cross-licensing agreements S(r; N ) is bilaterally e¢ cient if and only if choosing to produce Q 12 (r; r) is optimal for coalition f1; 2g when all other …rms produce the individual equilibrium output corresponding to a symmetric royalty r. The major di¤erence between public cross-licensing and private cross-licensing is that the Stackelberg e¤ect and the licensing revenue e¤ect are absent under the latter because of the unobservability of the deviations in the private cross-licensing stage:
formally speaking, the analysis under private cross-licensing can be derived from that under public cross-licensing by setting BR 0 12 (Q 12 ) equal to zero when considering the e¤ect of a coalition's deviation (in the …rst stage of the game) on its pro…t. This implies that S(r m ; N ) is the unique bilaterally e¢ cient set of symmetric agreements.
Proposition 3 (private bilateral cross-licensing) In the two-stage game of private cross-licensing followed by Cournot competition, S(r m ; N ) is the unique bilaterally e¢ cient set of symmetric cross-licensing agreements.
Therefore, the result that …rms are able to sustain the monopoly outcome through bilateral agreements is even stronger in the case of private cross-licensing: in this scenario, the monopoly outcome is always the unique symmetric outcome.
Before discussing the robustness of our monopolization result, we provide the main intuitions behind it. Consider …rst the case of private cross-licensing agreements. The monopoly output Q m is de…ned by the following …rst-order condition:
Moreover, since r m allows to achieve the monopoly outcome, the …rst-order condition with respect to q i for a single …rm i is given by:
Thus, an increase in a …rm's perceived marginal cost by (N 1) r m makes it act as if it were internalizing the e¤ects of its decision on its (N 1) rivals. Therefore, the payment of a per-unit royalty r m to each rival has the same e¤ect as internalizing the impact of a price reduction on that rival. Formally, this amounts to writing
which follows immediately from (13) and (14).
Suppose now that two …rms (i; j) contemplate a joint deviation in the cross-licensing stage.
By agreeing on some royalties (r i!j ; r j!i ), they can choose a joint output q i + q j di¤erent from 2Q m =N . However, it turns out that the …rst-order condition for the coalition's maximization program is satis…ed exactly at q i + q j = 2Q m =N :
which is easily derived from (14) by adding P 0 (Q m ) Q m N to its LHS and substracting r m from its RHS. The intuition behind this result is as follows. On the one hand, a two-…rm coalition's marginal cost is lower than a single …rm's marginal cost by r m ; which gives the coalition an incentive to increase its output. This is the royalty-saving e¤ect. On the other hand, when two …rms decide jointly the royalties they charge each other, they internalize the competitive externalities they exert on each other in the competition stage. This is the coordination e¤ect.
Since the payment of r m is equivalent to internalizing the e¤ect of price reduction on one rival, these two e¤ects cancel out.
Consider now the case of public cross-licensing agreements. The discussion above shows that the coordination e¤ect and the royalty-saving e¤ect cancel out when all …rms charge each other r = r m : It remains to provide an intuition for why the two other e¤ects that appear under public cross-licensing, i.e., the Stackelberg e¤ect and the licensing revenue e¤ect also cancel out.
Consider the coalition comprised of …rms 1 and 2. When all …rms charge each other r = r m , a marginal decrease dQ 12 < 0 in the joint output Q 12 of the …rms outside the coalition (due to an increase in the coalition's output Q 12 ) induces a variation in the coalition's pro…t by P 0 (Q) 2Q m N dQ 12 2r m dQ 12 . The …rst term captures the Stackelberg e¤ect: a marginal decrease in Q 12 increases the market price by P 0 (Q)dQ 12 which induces an increase P 0 (Q) 2Q m N dQ 12 in the coalition's downstream pro…t. The second term captures the licensing revenue e¤ect: a marginal decrease in Q 12 results in a reduction in the coalition's licensing revenues by 2r m dQ 12 :
Thus, the coalition internalizes both the positive impact of a decrease in its rivals' output on its downstream pro…t but also the negative impact of such decrease on its upstream pro…t. The reason why these two e¤ects cancel out can be seen as the dual of the reason why the coordination e¤ect and the royalty-saving e¤ect cancel out: charging a per-unit royalty equal to r m is an indirect way for the members of the coalition to fully internalize the e¤ect of their joint decision on their rivals.
Extensions
In the supplementary material, we show that …rms are able to sustain the fully cooperative outcome in two extensions of our baseline model which we brie ‡y discuss below.
k-e¢ cient agreements
In this extension, we investigate cross-licensing agreements that are k-e¢ cient in the sense that no coalition of size k 2 f3; :::; N 1g …nds it optimal to change the terms of the cross-licensing agreements among its members. Note that the special case k = 2 corresponds to the bilateral e¢ ciency criterion while k = N corresponds to industry-pro…t maximization.
Consider …rst the case of public cross-licensing agreements. We show that the set of (symmetric) k-e¢ cient royalties depends again on the magnitude of the Stackelberg e¤ect relative to the coordination e¤ect. If the Stackelberg e¤ect dominates the coordination e¤ect, then there are two k-e¢ cient royalties: r = 0 and r = r m . However, if the Stackelberg e¤ect is dominated by the coordination e¤ect, then the unique k-e¢ cient royalty is r = r m . Therefore, in both cases, the fully cooperative outcome is sustainable through k-e¢ cient cross-licensing agreements. Moreover, our analysis shows that the relative magnitude of the Stackelberg e¤ect with respect to the coordination e¤ect decreases in the size of the coalition k, which makes the scenario in which r = 0 arises as a sustainable outcome less likely as k increases. The intuition behind this result is that, for a given number of …rms in the industry, the magnitude of the Stackelberg e¤ect tends to decrease when the size of the coalition increases (because the number of …rms outside the coalition decreases) while the magnitude of the coordination e¤ect increases (since it increases in the number of …rms inside the coalition). In the limit case of k = N , the Stackelberg e¤ect completely disappears.
Consider now the case of private cross-licensing agreements. As in the baseline model, it turns out that the outcome in this scenario can be formally derived from the one under public cross-licensing by considering the special case in which the Stackelberg e¤ect and the licensing revenue e¤ect would be absent: the fully cooperative royalty is the unique symmetric royalty sustainable through k-e¢ cient agreements.
Bertrand competition
In this extension, we assume that …rms produce di¤erentiated goods and compete in prices.
Again we consider the e¤ects of a deviation by a two-…rm coalition in the …rst stage of the game on both the downstream and the upstream pro…ts.
Consider …rst the case of public cross-licensing agreements. As in the Cournot case, a variation in the royalties charged by two …rms to each other has two e¤ects on their joint downstream pro…t: a Stackelberg e¤ect and a coordination e¤ect. Moreover, the e¤ect of such variation on the coalition's upstream pro…ts can also be divided into a royalty-saving e¤ect and a licensingrevenue e¤ect. However, in the Bertrand case, these two e¤ects are more subtle than in the Cournot case: beside the direct royalty saving e¤ect and the indirect licensing-revenue e¤ect (i.e., through the change in the rivals'prices) that appear under Cournot competition, a change in the royalties also has an indirect royalty saving e¤ect (since the change in the rivals'prices a¤ects the demand for the products of the …rms in the coalition) and a direct licensing-revenue e¤ect (since the change in the prices charged by the …rms in the coalition a¤ects each rival's demand).
Our analysis shows that the fully cooperative royalty is the unique symmetric royalty sustainable through bilaterally e¢ cient agreements. In sharp contrast to the Cournot case, r = 0 is never a bilaterally e¢ cient royalty under Bertrand competition. The intuition behind this stems from the fact that the Bertrand game features strategic complementarity (under the standards assumptions we make) while the Cournot game is a game of strategic substitutes. This entails that the Stackelberg e¤ect and the coordination e¤ect are reinforcing each other under the Bertrand case. Therefore, considering a situation in which all …rms charge a royalty of r = 0 to their competitors, a coalition of two …rms would increase its downstream pro…t by increasing the royalties they charge each other. This, combined with the fact that upstream pro…ts are zero when all …rms charge r = 0, implies that a coalition of two …rms has an incentive to deviate in the …rst stage of the game, meaning that r = 0 is not bilaterally e¢ cient.
Consider now the case of private cross-licensing agreements. Again the analysis of private agreements can be derived from that of public agreements by putting aside all the indirect e¤ects. It turns out, as in the Cournot case, that the unique (symmetric) bilaterally e¢ cient royalty is the fully cooperative royalty.
A more general model
In this section, we develop a general model that can be applied to situations di¤erent from cross-licensing of patents and shows the robustness of our main result. 16 Consider the following N-…rm two-stage game:
Stage 1 (upstream bilateral agreements): Firms agree bilaterally on transfers they make to each other. More speci…cally, all pairs of …rms (i; j) simultaneously choose a pair of (real-valued) input prices (r i!j ; r j!i ) as well as (real-valued) …xed transfers (F i!j ; F j!i ). We set the following assumptions regarding the e¤ects of transfers on payo¤s: G1 For any i; there exists a function i such that, for any (x;r; F ), i (x;r; F ) = i (x;r) + P j6 =i
G2 For any i; j such that i 6 = j, and any x, i (x;r) + j (x;r) does not depend on r i!j . G3 For any i; j; k such that k = 2 fi; jg, and any x, k (x;r) does not depend on r i!j .
We also make the following technical assumptions:
G4 For any r, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium x (r) to the second-stage subgame.
G5 For any r, any (i; j) and any r 0 i!j ; r 0 j!i , the two-player game derived from the Nplayer downstream game by …xing the actions of players k = 2 fi; jg to x k (r) has a unique Nash
G6 There exists a unique vector x m of downstream actions that maximizes the (downstream) joint payo¤ of all players; moreover the joint payo¤ function is di¤erentiable at x m and the latter is the unique solution to the corresponding system of FOCs.
This general model can be applied to many economic situations, including:
-Cross-licensing: r i!j is a per-unit royalty paid by patent holder i to patent holder j and x i is a price or a quantity. Note that the general model applies not only to the case in which cross-licensing partners produce substitutable goods (which is the scenario considered in the cross-licensing model developed previously) but also to the case in which they produce complementary goods.
-Two-way access pricing in telecommunication networks: r i!j is the access charge paid by network i to network j and x i is the linear retail price charged by network i to its customers (see Armstrong, 1998 , La¤ont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a , 1998b for a duopolistic setting) -Interconnection among Internet backbone companies: r i!j is the access charge paid by backbone company i to j in a transit agreement and x i is the capacity choice made by i (see Crémer, Rey and Tirole, 2000) .
-Interbank payments for the use of ATMs: r i!j is the interchange fee paid by bank i to bank j and x i is the number of ATMs deployed by bank i (see Donze and Dubec, 2006 , for a setting with multilateral negotiation of the interchange fee).
Note that the general model introduced above is not a generalization of our cross-licensing model stricto sensu. First, in contrast to the cross-licensing model, input prices can take positive as well as negative values. This rules out non-interior equilibria, which simpli…es the analysis by making it possible to rely on …rst-order conditions. Another di¤erence with the baseline model is that the …rst stage of our general model is slightly di¤erent from that of the cross-licensing model: there, we assumed that …rms can decide not to sign an agreement in the …rst stage while in the current model, it is implicitly assumed that each pair of …rms sign an agreement (the only decision variable is the terms of their agreement). However, this restriction does not entail any loss of generality when …rms'incentives are such that each pair of …rms …nd it jointly pro…table to sign a bilateral upstream agreement, as is the case in our cross-licensing model. Moreover, this assumption is satis…ed for upstream agreements that are made mandatory by regulators as is typically the case for instance with interconnection among telecommunication companies.
We now introduce the following de…nitions which generalize those adopted in our crosslicensing model:
De…nition 3 A vector r of input prices is fully cooperative if
De…nition 4 A vector r of privately observable input prices is bilaterally e¢ cient if for any (i; j) with i 6 = j, the following holds:
where r ij denotes the vector obtained from r by removing r i!j and r j!i .
De…nition 5 A vector r of publicly observable input prices is bilaterally e¢ cient if for any (i; j) with i 6 = j, the following holds:
Let D denote the set of vectors r of input prices such that for any (i; j), x j (:) andx j (:) are di¤erentiable with respect to all their arguments at r and i (:; r) is di¤erentiable with respect to all its arguments at x (r) : 17 The following provides a su¢ cient condition for a vector r 2 D of input prices to be fully cooperative. This condition also ensures that a multilateral agreement involving all …rms allows them to achieve the monopoly outcome in the downstream market.
Lemma 3 A su¢ cient condition for a vector r 2 D of input prices to be fully cooperative is that for any j 2 f1; :::; N g ;
Moreover, when this condition is met, the fully cooperative upstream agreements allow …rms to achieve the fully cooperative downstream outcome.
Private agreements
We now provide a necessary condition for a vector of privately observable input prices in D to be bilaterally e¢ cient.
Lemma 4 Assume that, for any r 2 D and any (i; j) 2 f1; :::; N g 2 with i 6 = j, we have @x i @r i!j @x j @r i!j @x i @r j!i @x j @r j!i 6 = 0;
where the argument r i!j ; r j!i ; x ij (r) is omitted. Then a necessary condition for a vector of privately observable input prices r 2 D to be bilaterally e¢ cient is that @ i @x j (x (r) ; r) = 0;
for any (i; j) 2 f1; :::; N g 2 such that i 6 = j.
Proof. See Appendix. Condition (17) means that r i!j and r j!i are independent instruments in the sense that any local downstream deviation can be obtained through a local upstream deviation. Let us show that this condition is satis…ed, for instance, in the simple context of the previous cross-licensing model with a downstream Cournot oligopoly featuring (potentially asymmetric) linear costs and linear (inverse) demand p = a Q. Then we have @x i @r i!j @x j @r i!j @x i @r j!i @x j @r j!i = @x i @c i @x j @c i @x i @c j @x j @c j = 1 9 > 0:
Note that in environments in which the second stage takes the form of a Cournot game and the input prices a¤ect only the marginal cost of production (such as our cross-licensing example),
Condition (17) means that own cost e¤ects (on output) are not equal to cross cost e¤ects. In fact, in imperfect competition models, the property that own cost e¤ects strictly dominate cross cost e¤ects is quite standard (see e.g., Vives, 1999).
Using the previous two lemmas, it is straightforward to get the following result about the cooperative potential of private bilateral agreements.
Proposition 4 (private bilateral agreements) Under Condition (17), a bilaterally e¢ cient vector of privately observable input prices r 2 D is necessarily fully cooperative.
Public agreements
We now provide a necessary condition for a vector of publicly observable input prices in D to be bilaterally e¢ cient.
Lemma 5 Assume that, for any r 2 D, det M public 6 = 0;
where M public is a N 2 N 2 matrix whose elements are de…ned as follows for any i; j; l; k 2 f1; :::; N g : In the matrix, the subscripts (i; j) refer to r i!j and the subscripts (l; k) refer to @ l @x k .
Then a necessary condition for a vector of publicly observable input prices r 2 D to be bilaterally e¢ cient is that @ i @x j (x (r) ; r) = 0;
Condition (18) is the counterpart of Condition (17) for publicly observable input prices.
Similarly to the case of privately observable input prices, this condition ensures that any local downstream deviation can be obtained through a local upstream deviation. The reason why Condition (18) has a less simple form than Condition (17) is that now a coalition that contemplates a deviation has to take into account the responses of its rivals in the second stage of the game.
Combining Lemmas 3 and 5, we get the following result about the cooperative potential of public bilateral agreements.
Proposition 5 (public bilateral agreements) Under Condition (18), a bilaterally e¢ cient vector of publicly observable input prices r 2 D is necessarily fully cooperative.
Thus, under mild conditions, bilaterally e¢ cient upstream agreements allow …rms to achieve the fully cooperative outcome regardless of whether their terms are private or public.
In the supplementary material we show that the ability of …rms to sustain the fully cooperative outcome through bilateral agreements holds in two extensions of our general model. The …rst one deals with situations in which some of the bilateral agreements are private while others are public. The second one examines the case in which only a subset of …rms sign bilateral agreements in the …rst stage of the game.
Policy implications
We now derive from our results some policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of bilateral cross-licensing agreements between competitors. grant safe harbor to cross-licensing agreements (not necessarily bilateral) among partners whose joint market share is below 20% (U.S. DoJ and FTC, 1995, p.22) . This policy relies on market forces to discipline cross-licensing partners when it comes to the level of royalties they agree on and presumes that …rms with relatively low market power will not …nd it pro…table to charge each other high per-unit royalties.
Our analysis shows that this disciplining e¤ect of market forces can arise only under a limited range of circumstances: the most competitive outcome (i.e., r = 0) is one of the sustainable outcomes only if i/ agreements are public 19 , ii/the Stackelberg e¤ect dominates the coordination e¤ect, and iii/ …rms compete in quantities. Moreover, we show that …rms can always sustain royalties that are high enough to implement the monopoly outcome (i.e., r = r m ), regardless of the information structure (i.e., whether the licensing terms are public or private) and the mode of downstream competition (i.e., Cournot or Bertrand). This result clearly questions the current antitrust treatment of cross-licensing agreements in the U.S. and the EU. Consider for instance the speci…c example of an industry comprised of ten symmetric …rms. In such setting, any bilateral cross-licensing agreements would bene…t from an antitrust exemption since the joint market share criterion used by American and European antitrust authorities would be satis…ed.
However, our …ndings show that such legal agreements allow …rms to achieve the monopoly outcome, which will make consumers worse o¤ if the cross-licensed technologies are relatively substitutable (see Section 2.2). This suggests in particular that multiple bilateral cross-licensing agreements involving the same …rm should not be treated separately by antitrust authorities.
Concluding remarks
The main message of this paper is as follows: under a wide range of circumstances, bilateral upstream agreements among competing …rms can allow them to achieve the same outcome as can be superior to the outcome of no upstream agreement at all. For instance, cross-licensing of patents can reduce …rms'costs such that the …nal price can be lower than the price without cross-licensing (see Section 2.2). Third, in the case of cross-licensing of patents, one should also 1 9 Anecdotical evidence strongly suggests that the vast majority of cross-licensing agreements are private. take into account how cross-licensing a¤ects …rms'incentives to invest in innovation.
It is possible to extend our setting to study some policy issues related to cross-licensing.
First, we can introduce, in addition to incumbent …rms, entrants with no (or weak) patent portfolios. This would allow us to study whether cross-licensing can be used to raise barriers to entry (U.S. DoJ and FTC, 2007) . from a deviation to a licensing agreement involving the payment of (r 1!2 ; r 2!1 ) is:
which can be rewritten as
Denoting c i the marginal cost of …rm i (including the royalties paid to the other …rms), the F.O.C. for …rm i 0 s maximization program is:
Summing the F.O.C.s for i = 1; 2; ::; N yields:
which shows that Q depends on (c 1 ; c 2 ; ::; c N ) only through X (c + r 1!2 + (N 2) r; c + r 2!1 + (N 2) r; c + (N 1) r; :::; c + (N 1) r), it then follows that both Q and Q 12 depend on (r 1!2 ; r 2!1 ) only through r 1!2 + r 2!1 , which, combined with (19), implies that 1 + 2 depends on (r 1!2 ; r 2!1 ) only through r 1!2 + r 2!1 :
Proof of Lemma 2
Since Q 12 (r;r) is strictly decreasing and continuous inr, then r 2 Arg max 
which means that Q 12 (r; r) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy of the coalition f1; 2g in the game G(r; N ):
Proof of Proposition 2
Let us …rst show some general preliminary results which will be useful for the subsequent speci…c analysis of the four considered scenarios. We have:
@ 12 @Q 12 (Q 12 ; r) = P 0 (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) Q 12 (1 + BR 0 12 (Q 12 )) + [P (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) (c + (N 1) r)] + r 1 + 2BR 0 12 (Q 12 ) = [c + N r P (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 ))] 1 + 2BR 0 12 (Q 12 ) + 2 P 0 (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) Q 12 2 + P (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) (c + (N 1) r)
Let us show that J(Q 12 ; r) is decreasing in Q 12 . We have @J(Q 12 ; r) @Q 12 = P 00 (Q)
Since P 00 (Q) Q 12 2 + P 0 (Q) < max [P 00 (Q) Q + P 0 (Q) ; P 0 (Q)] < 0 then J(Q 12 ; r) is decreasing in Q 12 : This, combined with the fact that the F.O.C. for each …rm i = 1; 2, satis…ed at the symmetric Cournot equilibrium, is given by J(Q 12 (r; r) ; r) = 0, yields that J(Q 12 ; r) Q 0 () Q 12 R Q 12 (r; r)
Since 1 + BR 0 1;2 (Q 12 ) > 0, it follows that D(Q 12 ; r) Q 0 () Q 12 R Q 12 (r; r)
Moreover, from BR 0 12 (Q 12 ) = P 00 (Q)BR 12 (Q 12 ) + (N 2)P 0 (Q) P 00 (Q)BR 12 (Q 12 ) + (N 1)P 0 (Q) it follows that 1 + 2BR 0 12 (Q 12 ) = P 00 (Q)BR 12 (Q 12 ) + (N 3)P 0 (Q) P 00 (Q)BR 12 (Q 12 ) + (N 1)P 0 (Q)
Since P 00 (Q)BR 12 (Q 12 )+(N 1)P 0 (Q) max ((N 1)P 0 (Q); P 00 (Q)Q + (N 1)P 0 (Q)) < 0, it follows that
(for any Q 12 such that BR 12 (Q 12 ) 6 = 0). From the fact that BR 12 (Q 12 ) N 2 N Q = BR 12 (Q 12 ) N 2 N (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) is decreasing in Q 12 and BR 12 (Q 12 (r; r)) = N 2 N Q (r; r) (by symmetry of the considered Cournot equilibrium), it follows that
In particular we obtain the following result which will be useful for the next steps of the proof:
(for any Q such that P 0 (Q) 6 = 0) then 1 + 2BR 0 12 (Q 12 ) < 0 for any Q 12 Q 12 (r; r) :
-Let us now show that r = r m is bilaterally e¢ cient regardless of whether the Stackelberg e¤ect dominates or is dominated by the coordination e¤ect. @ 12 @Q 12 (Q 12 ; r m ) = P 0 (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) Q 12 (1 + BR 0 12 (Q 12 )) + [P (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) (c + (N 1) r m )] + r m 1 + 2BR 0 12 (Q 12 ) = 2 P 0 (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) Q 12 2 + r m (1 + BR 0 12 (Q 12 )) + [P (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) (c + N r m )]
Since c + N r m P (Q (r m ; r m )) = 0 then P (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) (c + N r m ) = P (Q 12 + BR 1;2 (Q 12 )) P (Q 12 (r m ; r m ) + BR 12 (Q 12 (r m ; r m )))
Moreover, combining c + N r m P (Q (r m ; r m )) = 0 with the F.O.C. P 0 (Q 12 (r m ; r m ) + BR 12 (Q 12 (r m ; r m ))) Q 12 (r m ;r m ) 2 + P (Q 12 (r m ; r m ) + BR 12 (Q 12 (r m ; r m ))) c (N 1) r m = 0 yields P 0 (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) Q 12 2 + r m = P 0 (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) Q 12 2 P 0 (Q 12 (r m ; r m ) + BR 12 (Q 12 (r m ; r m ))) Q 12 (r m ; r m ) 2
Therefore, @ 12 @Q 12 (Q 12 ; r m ) = [2P 0 (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) Q 12 2 2P 0 (Q 12 (r m ; r m + BR 12 (Q 12 (r m ; r m ))) Q 12 (r m ; r m ) 2 ] 1 + BR 0 12 (Q 12 (r m ; r m ) + [P (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) P (Q 12 (r m ; r m ) + BR 12 (Q 12 (r m ; r m )))]
Using the fact that P 0 (Q) < 0 and 1 + BR 0 12 (Q 12 ) > 0, it is straightforward to show that both functions P 0 (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) Q 12 2 and P (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) are decreasing in Q 12 , which implies that @ 12 @Q 12 (Q 12 ; r m ) R 0 () Q 12 Q Q 12 (r m ; r m ) Therefore, Q 12 (r m ; r m ) maximizes 12 (Q 12 ; r m ) over [0; Q 12 (r m ; 0)], which is equivalent to the fact that S(r m ; N ) is bilaterally e¢ cient.
-Consider now the case QP 00 (Q) P 0 (Q) > N (N 3) N 2 and let us show that r = 0 is bilaterally e¢ cient, that is Q 12 (0; 0) maximizes 12 (Q 12 ; 0) over [0; Q 12 (0; 0)]. We have @ 12 @Q 12 (Q 12 ; 0) = (c P (Q 12 + BR 1;2 (Q 12 ))) (1 + 2BR 0 12 (Q 12 )) + D(Q 12 ; 0)
where D(Q 12 ; r) is de…ned in the beginning of the proof.
Let us now show that P 00 (Q 12 +BR 12 (Q 12 ))BR 12 (Q 12 )+(N 3)P 0 (Q 12 +BR 12 (Q 12 )) < 0 for any Q 12 2 [0; Q 12 (0; 0)], which, by (23), is su¢ cient to state that 1 + 2BR 0 12 (Q 12 ) < 0 for any Q 12 2 [0; Q 12 (0; 0)]. On the one hand, if P 00 (Q 12 + BR 1;2 (Q 12 )) < 0 then it follows from BR 12 (Q 12 ) 0 and P 0 (Q) < 0 that 1 + 2BR 0 12 (Q 12 ) < 0. On the other hand, if P 00 (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) 0 then from BR 12 (Q 12 ) Q, it follows that P 00 (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 ))BR 12 (Q 12 ) + (N 3)P 0 (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) P 00 (Q)Q + (N 3)P 0 (Q). Note …rst that if P 00 (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) 0, it must hold that N 4; otherwise the condition QP 00 (Q) P 0 (Q) > N (N 3) N 2 (which is one of the two conditions de…ning the present scenario) would be violated. This implies that P 00 (Q)Q+(N 3)P 0 (Q) P 00 (Q)Q+P 0 (Q), which combined with A3 yields P 00 (Q)Q+(N 3)P 0 (Q) < 0 and, therefore, 1+2BR 0 12 (Q 12 ) < 0. We are now in position to state that, for any Q 12 2 [0; Q 12 (0; 0)], the latter inequality holds independently of whether P 00 (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) < 0 or P 00 (Q 12 + BR 12 (Q 12 )) 0. Combining that with the fact that the two inequalities c P (Q 12 + BR 1;2 (Q 12 )) c P (Q 12 (0; 0) + BR 1;2 (Q 12 (0; 0))) < 0 and D(Q 12 ; 0) 0 (from (22))hold for any Q 12 2 [0; Q 12 (0; 0)], we get that @ 12 @Q 12 (Q 12 ; 0) 0 for any Q 12 2 [0; Q 12 (0; 0)]. This implies that Q 12 (0; 0) maximizes 12 (Q 12 ; 0) over [0; Q 12 (0; 0)].
Therefore, S(0; N ) is bilaterally e¢ cient.
Proof of Lemma 3
By G1, G2 and G3 it holds that
i (x; r) does not depend on r for any x. By G6, x m is then the unique solution to the system of N equations:
@ i @x j (x; r) = 0 for j 2 f1; :::; N g ;
for any r: Therefore, if a vector r 2 D is such that
@x j (x (r) ; r) = 0 for any j 2 f1; :::; N g, then it must be that x (r) = x m , which implies that (i)
for any r 0 ; that is, r is fully cooperative, and (ii) the fully cooperative upstream agreements allows the agent to achieve the fully cooperative downstream outcome.
Proof of Lemma 4
Assume that r 2 D is bilaterally e¢ cient. Then for any (i; j) 2 f1; :::; N g 2 with i 6 = j, it must hold that @ @r i!j ( i + j ) x i r i!j ; r j!i ; x ij (r) ;x j r i!j ; r j!i ; x ij (r) ; x ij (r) ; r ij = 0;
which can be rewritten as @x i @r i!j r i!j ; r j!i ; x ij (r) @ i @x i x i r i!j ; r j!i ; x ij (r) ;x j r i!j ; r j!i ; x ij (r) ; x ij (r) ; r ij + @x j @r i!j r i!j ; r j!i ; x ij (r) @ i @x j x i r i!j ; r j!i ; x ij (r) ;x j r i!j ; r j!i ; x ij (r) ; x ij (r) ; r ij +
Using the de…nition of a Nash equilibrium , it is straightforward to see thatx i r i!j ; r j!i ; x ij (r) =
x i (r) and thatx j r i!j ; r j!i ; x ij (r) = x j (r). Therefore, it holds that @x i @r i!j r i!j ; r j!i ; x ij (r) @ i @x i (x (r) ; r) + @x j @r i!j r i!j ; r j!i ; x ij (r) @ i @x j (x (r) ; r) + @x i @r i!j r i!j ; r j!i ; x ij (r) @ j @x i (x (r) ; r) + @x j @r i!j r i!j ; r j!i ; x ij (r) @ j @x j (x (r) ; r) = 0:
By de…nition of the downstream Nash equilibrium x (r), it holds that @ i @x i (x (r) ; r) = @ j @x j (x (r) ; r) = 0:
This yields @x j @r i!j r i!j ; r j!i ; x ij (r) @ i @x j (x (r) ; r) + @x i @r i!j r i!j ; r j!i ; x ij (r) @ j @x i (x (r) ; r) = 0:
By symmetry we also have
Denoting y ij = @ i @x j (x (r) ; r) and y ji = @ j @x i (x (r) ; r) ; and omitting the argument r i!j ; r j!i ; x ij (r) , the latter two equations can be rewritten as a two-equation linear system in y ji and y ij : 8 < : @x i @r i!j :y ji + @x j @r i!j :y ij = 0 @x i @r j!i :y ji + @x j @r j!i :y ij = 0 If @x i @r i!j @x j @r i!j @x i @r j!i @x j @r j!i 6 = 0, then the latter system has a unique solution, given by y ji = y ij = 0:
Hence, we get the following: for any (i; j) 2 f1; :::; N g 2 with i 6 = j, the following equation must hold @ i @x j (x (r) ; r) = 0:
Proof of Lemma 5 Assume that a given vector of public input prices r 2 D is bilaterally e¢ cient. The FOCs associated with
Hence, the FOCs associated with the bilateral e¢ ciency of the upstream agreements give rise to N (N 1) conditions. Adding these to the N FOCs @ i @x i (x (r) ; r) = 0 associated to the downstream Nash equilibrium, we end up with a system of N 2 equations. The latter can be represented as a linear system M public :Y = 0 where M public is a N 2 N 2 matrix whose elements are de…ned as follows:
for any i; j; l; k 2 f1; :::; N g; and Y is a N 1 matrix whose elements (which are the "unknown variables") are de…ned as follows Y N (l 1)+k = @ l @x k (x (r) ; r) :
If det M public 6 = 0, then this linear system has a unique solution given by @ l @x k (x (r) ; r) = 0;
for any k; l 2 f1; :::; N g ; which completes the proof.
11 Supplementary material for online publication 11.1 Alternative equivalent formulation: value-increasing patents Instead of assuming that access to more patents reduces a …rm's marginal cost, we can assume that access to more patents increases the value of the product produced by the …rm. We below show that our model of cost-reducing patents can be equivalently interpreted as a model of value-increasing patents.
We consider a constant symmetric marginal cost c for all …rms. Each …rm has one patent.
Let v(n) represent the value of the product produced by a …rm when the …rm has access to n 2 f1; :::; N g number of distinct patents with v(N ) v(N 1)
Let v (v 1 ; :::; v N ) be the vector representing the value of each …rm's product after the licensing stage.
We de…ne Cournot competition for given v (v 1 ; :::; v N ) as follows. Each …rm i simultaneously chooses its quantity q i . Given v (v 1 ; :::; v N ), q (q 1 ; :::; q N ) and Q = q 1 + ::: + q N , the quality-adjusted equilibrium prices are determined by the following two conditions:
-an indi¤erence condition:
v i p i = v j p j for all (i; j) 2 f1; :::; N g 2 ;
-a market-clearing condition:
In other words, p is the price for the product of a …rm which has access to its own patent only.
The market clearing condition means that this price is adjusted to make the total supply equal to the demand. The indi¤erence condition implies that the price each …rm charges is adjusted such that all consumers who buy any product are indi¤erent among all products. A micro-foundation of this setup can be provided as follows. There is a mass one of consumers. Each consumer has a unit demand and hence buys at most one unit among all products. A consumer's gross utility from having a unit of product of …rm i is given by u + v i : u is speci…c to the consumer while v i is common to all consumers. Let F (u) represent the cumulative distribution function of u: Then, by construction of quality-adjusted prices, any consumer is indi¤erent among all products and the marginal consumer indi¤erent between buying any product and not buying is characterized by u + v p = 0, implying
In equilibrium, p is adjusted such that 1 F (p v) = Q. Let P (Q) be the inverse demand function. In equilibrium, a …rm's pro…t is given by
After making the following change of variables
the pro…t can be equivalently written as
which is the pro…t expression in our original model of cost-reducing patents. Therefore, our model of cost-reducing patents can be equivalently interpreted as a model of value-increasing patents.
Robustness to deviations by coalitions of any size
In this extension, we show that the main results previously obtained by considering a coalition of size 2 extend to a coalition of any given size k (with 3 k N 1). We will say that a set of cross-licensing agreements is k-e¢ cient if no coalition of size k …nds it optimal to change the terms of the cross-licensing agreements between the members of the coalition. We consider …rst the case of public cross-licensing and then the case of private cross-licensing.
Suppose that cross-licensing agreements are public. Consider the deviation of a coalition composed of f1; :::; kg in the licensing stage. Lemma 1 continues to hold in the case of coalition of size k and hence, without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to deviations involving a symmetric royaltyr. For given (r;r), let Q k (r;r) denote the sum of the outputs of the …rms in the coalition in the (second-stage) equilibrium of Cournot competition. Let Q k (r;r) Q (r;r) Q k (r;r).
Denoting Q k the total quantity produced by the considered coalition and r the common royalty paid to the …rms outside the coalition, the coalition's pro…t can be rewritten as
Equation (25) generalizes (6). Suppose that the coalition marginally expands or contracts its output Q k with respect to Q k (r; r). Then, we have @ D k @Q k (Q k (r; r); r) = [P (Q (r; r)) (c + (N 1) r)] [k 1 + kBR 0 k (Q k (r; r))]: @ U k @Q k (Q k (r; r); r) = r k 1 + kBR 0 k (Q k (r; r)) :
Summing up the two terms leads to @ k @Q k (Q k (r; r); r) = [c + N r P (Q (r; r))] [k 1 + kBR 0 k (Q k (r; r))]:
Equation (26) generalizes (11). In particular, the …rst bracket term is the same in both equations and does not depend on k while the second bracket term in (26) depends on k. The Stackelberg e¤ect dominates the coordination e¤ect if and only if k 1 + kBR 0 k (Q k (r; r)) < 0. We have
The important point is that at r = r m , the …rst bracket term in (26) is zero regardless of the coalition size: c + N r m P (Q (r m ; r m )) = 0. Therefore, we have the following result Proposition 6 (public cross-licensing) Consider the two-stage game of public cross-licensing followed by Cournot competition. Proposition 6 generalizes Proposition 2 to any given size of coalition. In particular, this proposition shows that the monopoly outcome is obtained for any size of coalition.
Proposition 6 also implies that Proposition 3 of private cross-licensing generalizes to coalitions of any size since private cross-licensing is formally a particular case of public cross-licensing in which the Stackelberg e¤ect is absent (i.e., BR 0 k = 0).
Proposition 7 (private cross-licensing) In the two-stage game of private cross-licensing followed by Cournot competition, S(r m ; N ) is the unique k-e¢ cient set of symmetric agreements.
Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated products
In this section we extend our analysis to a di¤erent mode of downstream competition. Consider the same game as before but assume now that …rms produce di¤erentiated goods and compete in prices in the second stage of the game. Let p j denote the price of product j 2 f1; 2; :::; N g, D i (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p N ) the demand for product i 2 f1; 2; :::; N g, and S i (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n ) 2 R n + j D i (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n ) > 0 . We make the following assumptions for each i 2 f1; 2; :::; N g : B1 D i is twice continuously di¤erentiable on S i . B2 (i) @D i @p i < 0, (ii) @D i @p j > 0 for any j 6 = i, and (iii) P n j=1 @D i (p;p;:::;p) @p j < 0 over the set S i .
B3 (i) @ 2 D i @p i @p j > 0 for any j 6 = i and (ii)
B4 P n j=1 @ 2 D i @p k @p j 0 for any k 6 = i on S i :
Conditions B1-B3 are quite general, and are commonly invoked for di¤erentiated-good demand systems to guarantee that the standard Bertrand game with linear cost is supermodular and has a unique equilibrium (see e.g., Vives, 1999) . They have the following meanings and economic interpretations. For B2, part (i) is just the ordinary law of demand; part (ii) says that goods i and j are substitutes; and part (iii) is a dominant diagonal condition for the Jacobian of the demand system, which is required to hold only at equal prices. It says that, along the diagonal, own price e¤ect on demand exceeds the total cross-price e¤ects. For B3, part (i) says that demand has strictly increasing di¤erences in own price and any rival's price, and part (ii) says that the Hessian of the demand system has a dominant diagonal.
Moreover, assume that the demand system is symmetric (i.e., products are symmetrically differentiated), and that a unique second-stage equilibrium exists for any …rst-stage cross-licensing agreements. Assumption B4 is a technical assumption ensuring the monotonicity of the secondstage equilibrium price with respect to …rst-stage royalties.
Note that, while Assumption B3 (i) guarantees that the second-stage pricing game features strategic complementarity when there is no cross-licensing agreement involving the payment of a strictly positive per-unit royalty (i.e., when the second-stage game is a standard Bertrand game), it does not imply that this property holds for all …rst-stage agreements.
The concept of bilateral e¢ ciency extends in a very natural way to the current setting, both for private and public agreements. As in the cournot case, we focus on the scenario in which all …rms license their patents to each other.
Fully cooperative royalty
Let us …rst characterize the fully cooperative downstream price when all …rms license their patents to each other. The latter, which we assume to be unique, is given as follows (by symmetry) by The corresponding F.O.C. is given by D 1 (p m ; :::; p m ) + (p m c) @D 1 @p 1 (p m ; :::; p m ) + (N 1) @D 2 @p 1 (p m ; :::; p m ) = 0:
When all cross-licensing agreements involve the payment of the same royalty r, …rm 1's pro…t function in the second-stage subgame is given by 1 (p 1 ; :::; p N ) = (p 1 (c + (N 1)r)) D 1 (p 1 ; :::; p N ) + r N X j=2 D j (p 1 ; :::; p N ) :
Using the symmetry of the problem, the second-stage equilibrium p (r) is given by D 1 (p (r); :::; p (r)) + @D 1 @p 1 (p (r) (c + (N 1)r)) + r(N 1) @D 2 @p 1 = 0;
where @D 1 @p 1 = @D 1 @p 1 (p (r); :::; p (r)) and similarly for @D 2 @p 1 . From (27) and (28), one derives the monopoly royalty satisfying p (r m ) = p m : r m = @D 2 @p 1 (p m ; :::; p m ) @D 2 @p 1 (p m ; :::; p m ) @D 1 @p 1 (p m ; :::; p m ) (p m c) :
Public agreements
Let us …rst introduce some useful notations. Let p 1 (r; r 1!2 ; r 2!1 ) and p 2 (r; r 1!2 ; r 2!1 ) denote the second-stage equilibrium prices when the royalty paid by …rm 1 to 2 is r 1!2 , the royalty paid by …rm 2 to 1 is r 2!1 , and all other cross-licensing agreements involve the payment of the same royalty r. With a slight abuse of notation, we will denote p (r) p 1 (r; r; r) = p 2 (r; r; r).
Furthermore, considering the special case where all …rms license their patents each other at the same royalty r > 0, de…ne R 12 (p 1 ; p 2 ; r) as follows: if N = 3, then R 12 (p 1 ; p 2 ; r) is the best response of …rm 3 to …rms 1 and 2 setting prices p 1 and p 2 ; if N > 3, then R 12 (p 1 ; p 2 ; r) is the (assumed unique) number such that for any i 2 f3; :::; N g, R 12 (p 1 ; p 2 ; r) is …rm i's best-response to …rms 1 and 2 setting prices p 1 and p 2 and all other …rms setting a price R 12 (p 1 ; p 2 ; r). 21
Note that R 12 (p (r) ; p (r) ; r) = p (r).
We now de…ne the counterpart of the game G(r; N ) when …rms set prices instead of quantities.
De…nition 6 For any r 0 and N 3, the game G B (r; N ) is de…ned by the following elements:
Players: There are N 1 players: coalition {1,2} and …rms i = 3; :::; N . Each player has a marginal production cost c (excluding royalties). The coalition pays a per-unit royalty r to each of the other players. Each …rm i 2 f3; :::; N g pays a per-unit royalty 2r to the coalition and a per-unit royalty r to each …rm j 2 f3; :::; N g n fig.
2 1 Here we make the implicit assumption that the best-response correspondence is indeed a function.
where D 12 (p 1 ; p 2 ; r) X i=1;2 D i (p 1 ; p 2 ; R 12 (p 1 ; p 2 ; r) ; :::; R 12 (p 1 ; p 2 ; r)) (p i (c + (N 1)r)) and U 12 (p 1 ; p 2 ; r) r 2 6 6 6 4 X i=1;2 D i (p 1 ; p 2 ; R 12 (p 1 ; p 2 ; r) ; :::; R 12 (p 1 ; p 2 ; r))+ 2 N X j=3 D j (p 1 ; p 2 ; R 12 (p 1 ; p 2 ; r) ; :::; R 12 (p 1 ; p 2 ; r)) 3 7 7 7 5
For a symmetric set of cross-licensing agreements S(r; N ) , with r > 0, to be bilaterally e¢ cient, it must hold that @ 12 @p 1 ((p (r); p (r); r) = @ 12 @p 2 ((p (r); p (r); r) = 0:
Our assumption that the coalition's problem is well-behaved ensures that the latter necessary …rst-order conditions are su¢ cient to characterize a bilaterally e¢ cient positive symmetric royalty.
Let us now investigate the e¤ects of a (local) variation of p 1 (or symmetrically p 2 ) on both sources of pro…t.
Considering …rst the coalition's downstream pro…t, we have @ D 12 @p 1 ((p (r); p (r); r) = @D 1 @p 1 + @D 2 @p 1 (p (r) (c + (N 1)r)) + D 1 (p (r); :::; p (r)) + (p (r) (c + (N 1)r)) 0 @ N X j=3 @ (D 1 + D 2 ) @p j 1 A @R 12 @p 1 ((p (r); p (r); r) :
From (28) it follows that:
@p 1 ((p (r); p (r); r) = @D 2 @p 1 (p (r) (c + 2(N 1)r)) +
A @R 12 @p 1 ((p (r); p (r); r) :
The …rst term, i.e., @D 2 @p 1 (p (r) (c + 2(N 1)r)), captures the coordination e¤ ect in this setting. In contrast to the Cournot setting, the sign of this e¤ect is ambiguous: Note however that it is positive in the special case of r = 0, which captures the usual collusive incentive to increase prices in the standard Bertrand model. The remaining term captures the Stackelberg e¤ect. Its sign is solely determined by the sign of @R 12 @p 1 ((p (r); p (r); r) : If the second stage pricing game features strategic complementarity 22 , then @R 12 @p 1 ((p (r); p (r); r) > 0 and hence the sign of the Stackelberg e¤ect is positive (as in the standard Bertrand game).
Considering now the coalition's upstream pro…t, we have: @ U 12 @p 1 ((p (r); p (r); r) = r @D 1 @p 1 + @D 2 @p 1 + 2r
A @R 12 @p 1 ((p (r); p (r); r)
The …rst term, which is negative (by B2 (ii) and (iii)), captures a direct royalty-saving e¤ ect.
The second term, which is positive, can be interpreted as the direct e¤ect of a price increase on licensing revenues. The third term, which has the same sign as @R 12 @p 1 ((p (r); p (r); r), captures an indirect royalty-saving e¤ ect. Finally, the fourth term, which has the same sign as @R 12 @p 1 ((p (r); p (r); r), can be interpreted as the indirect e¤ect of a price increase on licensing revenues. Note that under Cournot setting, we have only the …rst and the last e¤ects.
Before stating the main result of this section, let us show why r = 0 cannot be a bilaterally e¢ cient symmetric royalty. In this special case, the upstream pro…ts are zero and Hence @ 12 @p 1 ((p (0); p (0); 0) > 0, which shows that it is not optimal for the coalition to set (p 1 ; p 2 ) = (p (0); p (0)) when r = 0: Lemma 6 then implies that S(0; N ) is not a set of bilaterally e¢ cient agreements. This contrasts with the case of Cournot competition. The reason for this is that, when r = 0, prices are strategic complements. Therefore, the Stackelberg e¤ect has a positive sign and thus reinforces the coordination e¤ect (while it mitigates it under Cournot competition).
The following proposition characterizes the bilaterally e¢ cient symmetric public agreements.
Proposition 8 (public bilateral cross-licensing: Bertrand) In the two-stage game of public cross-licensing followed by Bertrand competition, S(r; N ) is bilaterally e¢ cient if and only if r = r m .
Proof. We have already shown that r = 0 is not a bilaterally e¢ cient symmetric royalty. We can therefore focus on interior royalties r > 0: The F.O.C. characterizing p (r) is given by D 1 (p (r); :::; p (r)) + @D 1 @p 1 : (p (r) (c + (N 1)r)) + r(N 1) @D 2 @p 1 = 0:
Assume that S(r; N ) is bilaterally e¢ cient. Then @ D 12 @p 1 ((p (r); p (r); r) + @ U 12 @p 1 ((p (r); p (r); r) = 0;
which is the same as @D 1 @p 1 + @D 2 @p 1 : (p (r) (c + (N 1)r)) + D 1 (p (r); :::; p (r)) + r @D 1 @p 1 + @D 2 @p 1 + 2r N X j=3 @D j @p 1 + (p (r) (c + (N 1)r)) 0 @ N X j=3 @(D 1 +D 2 ) @p j 1 A @R 12 @p 1 ((p (r); p (r); r) + r 0 @ N X j=3 @(D 1 +D 2 ) @p j 1 A @R 12 @p 1 + 2r N X k=3 0 @ N X j=3 @D j @p k 1 A @R 12 @p 1 ((p (r); p (r); r) = 0:
Using the symmetry of the problem the latter can be rewritten as D 1 (p (r); :::; p (r)) + @D 1 @p 1 (p (r) (c + (N 2)r)) + @D 2 @p 1 (p (r) (c (N 2)r)) +2(N 2) @R 12 @p 1 ((p (r); p (r); r) h r @D 1 @p 1 + (p (r) (c + r)) @D 2 @p 1 i = 0:
Combining the latter and (29) yields 1 + 2(N 2) @R 12 @p 1 ((p (r); p (r); r) r @D 1 @p 1 + (p (r) (c + r)) @D 2 @p 1 = 0;
which implies r @D 1 @p 1 + (p (r) (c + r)) @D 2 @p 1 = 0:
Adding the latter multiplied by (N 1) to (29) yields D 1 (p (r); :::; p (r)) + @D 1 @p 1 : (p (r) c) + (N 1) @D 2 @p 1 (p (r) c) = 0:
The latter condition characterizes uniquely p m . Therefore p (r) = p m :
Thus, a necessary condition for S (r; N ) to be bilaterally e¢ cient is that p (r) = p m : This condition can be easily shown to be su¢ cient by checking that @ D 12 @p 1 (p m ; p m ; r m ) + @ U 12 @p 1 (p m ; p m ; r m ) = 0 is satis…ed (this is readily obtained by following the previous steps in reverse order) and using the fact the coalition's maximization problem in the game G B (r; N ) is well behaved. We can therefore conclude that S (r; N ) is bilaterally e¢ cient if and only if p (r) = p m
To complete the proof it remains to show that p (r) = p m if and only if r = r m : Since p (r m ) = p m , it is su¢ cient to establish the strict monotonicity of p (:) to prove the latter equivalence result. Di¤erentiating (28) with respect to r; we get dp dr = (N 1) h @D 1 @p 1 @D 1 @p 2 i N X j=1 @D 1 @p j + N X j=1 @ 2 D 1 @p 1 @p j (p (r) (c + (N 1)r)) + @D 1 @p 1 + r(N 1) N X j=1 @ 2 D 2 @p 1 @p j
The numerator is strictly negative by B2 (i) and (ii), and the denominator is strictly negative by B2 (iii), B3 (ii), B2 (i) and B4. We can therefore state that p (r) is strictly increasing in r, which completes the proof.
11.4
Extensions of the general model
Mixed price vectors
In this extension we deal with the case of mixed input price vectors, i.e., vectors of prices such that some of the prices are public and the others are private. More speci…cally, we consider input price vectors r = ((r i!j ; r j!i )) 1 i<j<N such that each input price pair (r i!j ; r j!i ), with i < j and i; j 2 f1; ::; N g, has a probability i;j 2 [0; 1] of being private and a probability 1 i;j of being public. For any i; j 2 f1; ::; N g such that i < j, de…ne j;i = i;j and denote = ( i;j ) i6 =j .
Privately observable input price vectors correspond to the special case where i;j = 1 for any i 6 = j and publicly observable input price vectors correspond to the special case where i;j = 0 for any i 6 = j.
We …rst extend the de…nition of bilateral e¢ ciency to the case of mixed input price vectors.
De…nition 7 A vector of mixed input prices r = ((r i!j ; r j!i )) 1 i<j<N associated with the vector of probabilities = ( i;j ) i6 =j is bilaterally e¢ cient if for any (i; j) such that i 6 = j the following holds:
(r i!j ; r j!i ) 2 Arg max (r 0 i!j ;r 0 j!i ) 2 4 i;j ( i + j ) x i r 0 i!j ; r 0 j!i ; x ij (r) ;x j r 0 i!j ; r 0 j!i ; x ij (r) ; x ij (r) ; r ij + (1 i;j ) ( i + j ) x r 0 i!j ; r 0 j!i ; r ij ; r ij 3 5
We now state the following lemma that provides a necessary condition for a vector of mixed input prices in D to be bilaterally e¢ cient :
Lemma 7 Consider a vector of probabilities = ( i;j ) i6 =j and let i;i = 1 for any i 2 f1; ::; N g. Assume that, for any r 2 D,.
det M mixed ( ) 6 = 0 (31)
where M mixed ( ) is a N 2 N 2 matrix whose elements are de…ned as follows M mixed N (i 1)+j;N (l 1)+k ( ) = i;j M private N (i 1)+j;N (l 1)+k + (1 i;j )M public N (i 1)+j;N (l 1)+k for any i; j; l; k 2 f1; :::; N g :
Then a necessary condition for a vector of mixed input prices r 2 D associated with the vector of probabilities = ( i;j ) i6 =j to be bilaterally e¢ cient is that @ i @x j (x (r) ; r) = 0;
Therefore we get the following result:
Proposition 10 (mixed bilateral agreement) Under Condition (31), a bilaterally e¢ cient vector of mixed input prices r 2 D associated with a vector of probabilities is necessarily fully cooperative.
Bilateral agreements among a subset of …rms
Let us now assume that only a strict subset of …rms engage in bilateral agreements. Without loss of generality, assume that only …rms 1; 2; :::; K, with K 2 f2; 3; :::; N 1g, sign upstream bilateral agreements while all N …rms play the downstream stage. The technical assumptions G4-G6 can be adapted in a straightforward way to this situation. Moreover, we adapt the de…nition of a fully cooperative vector of privately observable input prices as follows:
De…nition 8 Consider K 2 f2; 3; :::; N 1g and assume that only …rms 1; 2; :::; K sign upstream agreements. A vector r = ((r i!j ; r j!i )) 1 i<j<K of input prices is intra-group fully cooperative if r 2 Arg max r 0 K X i=1 i x r 0 ; r 0 :
We now adapt the concept of bilateral e¢ ciency in the following way:
De…nition 9 Consider K 2 f2; 3; :::; N 1g : A vector of privately observable input prices r = ((r i!j ; r j!i )) 1 i<j<K is bilaterally e¢ cient if for any (i; j) 2 f1; 2; :::; Kg 2 such that i 6 = j the following holds:
(r i!j ; r j!i ) 2 Arg max (r 0 i!j ;r 0 j!i ) ( i + j ) x i r 0 i!j ; r 0 j!i ; x ij (r) ;x j r 0 i!j ; r 0 j!i ; x ij (r) ; x ij (r) ; r ij :
We also de…ne the counterpart D K of the set D in the game we consider in this extension.
Let D K denote the set of vectors r = ((r i!j ; r j!i )) 1 i<j<K of input prices such that for any i; j, x j (:) andx j (:) are di¤erentiable with respect to all its arguments at r and i (:; r) is di¤erentiable with respect to all its arguments at x (r) :
We …rst extend Lemma 3 by providing a su¢ cient condition for vector r = ((r i!j ; r j!i )) 1 i<j<K of input prices to be intra-group fully cooperative.
Lemma 8 A su¢ cient condition for a vector r = ((r i!j ; r j!i )) 1 i<j<K 2 D K of input prices to be intra-group fully cooperative is that for any j 2 f1; :::; Kg ; K X i=1 @ i @x j (x (r) ; r) = 0:
